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Modern Imperialism in Crimea and the 
Donbas 
JULIUS BODIE* 
 
The diplomatic crises that have enveloped Ukraine since early 2014 
threaten to transform the global political and legal order that materialized 
in the aftermath of Soviet Russia’s dissolution.  The unpredictable pattern 
of Russian foreign policy has resulted in the first forcible annexation of a 
sovereign European territory since World War II and the perpetuation of 
a ‘hybrid war’ in Eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where pro-Russian 
separatists have sought to reunite swathes of captured territory as part of 
Novorossya.1  Both of these developments can be traced to legacy Soviet 
influences that are embodied in President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive 
foreign policy.  However, the style and characterization of military action 
throughout the conflicts differ in each case.  While the first conflict in 
Crimea involved an overt Russian military presence securing a bloodless, 
diplomatic circumvention of international law that has since been decried 
by the Western world, the conflict in the Donbas has been characterized 
as a hybrid war, involving a high volume of casualties and disputed 
reports of state sponsorship and participation that allow Russia to 
maintain plausible deniability about its true involvement. 
Although the historical relationship among Ukraine, Crimea, and 
Russia is incredibly nuanced and complex in the years since Catherine 
the Great first annexed the peninsula in 1783, the current governing State 
treaties, customary international law, and domestic constitutions quite 
clearly undermine any legitimate basis for Russia’s forcible annexation 
 
*J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Special thanks to Professor David Glazier and the 
devoted staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review. 
 1. THOMAS D. GRANT, AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: TERRITORY, RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  See also Ivan Nechepurenko, Death of 
Novorossia: Why the Kremlin Abandoned Ukraine Separatist Project, THE MOSCOW TIMES (May 
25, 2015), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/death-of-novorossia-why-kremlin-
abandoned-ukraine-separatist-project/522320.html. 
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of Crimea in March 2014.2  In spite of Moscow’s claims detailing 
Crimea’s purported historical right of self-determination, the annexation 
has been condemned by several world leaders and supranational legal 
bodies.3  The Russian-backed separatist movements in the Donbas region 
of Eastern Ukraine, including the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic 
(LNR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), have recently stalled 
in the achievement of their goals, with neither the Kiev government nor 
the separatist forces clearly in control of the disputed territories.  It has 
been difficult to gauge the legality of this separatist movement; various 
media accounts have labeled it as a ‘civil war,’ ‘hybrid war,’ ‘rebellion,’ 
and ‘anti-terrorist operation.’4  The situation in the Donbas is much more 
complex than Crimea – the territory is larger, the support for Russia 
among the population is lower, and there are no large military bases from 
which to launch operations.  By perpetuating this quagmire, Putin has 
effectively destabilized Ukraine while undermining the legitimacy of 
President Poroshenko’s regime and maintaining a high degree of 
deniability about Russian influence over the separatists.  The mere 
presence of the frozen conflict in the Donbas renders it impossible for a 
truly whole Ukraine, with internationally recognized boundaries, to 
conduct itself as a sovereign polity. 
This note will seek to analyze and compare the legality of Russian 
involvement in these two crises in Ukraine under the guiding principles 
of customary international law, State treaties, diplomatic pacts and 
domestic constitutions.  In Part I, the annexation of Crimea will be shown 
to be illegitimate.  Under at least two fundamental UN doctrines, six State 
treaties and diplomatic agreements, and three domestic constitutions, 
Russia’s actions appear to be a violation of Ukraine’s territorial 
sovereignty, as well as an illegal use of force. 
While the stalemate in the Donbas region is currently characterized 
as a “non-international armed conflict”, this paper will seek to 
demonstrate that in two periods of hostilities (August 2014 and January 
2015), Russian military actions constituted an illegal use of force, and 
 
 2. Adam Taylor, To understand Crimea, take a look back at its complicated history, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-
understand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history. 
 3. Brad Simpson, Self-Determination in the Age of Putin, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/21/self-determination-in-the-age-of-putin. 
 4. Bohdan Harasymiw, Harasymiw on War in Ukraine: Undeclared, Unacknowledged and 
Unabated, UKRAINE TRUTH (Feb. 4, 2015), http://ukrainian-studies.ca/2015/01/29/bohdan-
harasymiw-war-ukraine-undeclared-unacknowledged-unabated. 
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perhaps even initiated an international armed conflict.5  The style of 
military action has differed in the Donbas from that in Crimea, however, 
and Part II will consider whether Russia violated international use of 
force and law of armed conflict standards with their actions in Illovaisk 
in August 2014 and Debaltseve in January 2015.  While Moscow has 
officially denied responsibility for the actions of the separatists, evidence 
will show that there has been an overt Russian presence conducting 
military operations against the government forces of Ukraine. 
The fact that the annexation of Crimea was completed in March 
2014 allows for a more complete legal analysis than the on-going war in 
the Donbas.  It was not until nearly a year after the annexation that 
President Putin admitted there was a Russian Special Forces operation 
ordered weeks in advance of the referendum.6  The war in the Donbas 
continues today and has taken the lives of over 3,500 Ukrainian 
servicemen and 2,300 civilians.7  It thus does not offer analysts the same 
benefit; the conflict must be viewed under a shroud of Russian denial by 
using evidence pulled from social media, journalists on the ground, and 
reports filed by international organizations.  This article will offer an 
evaluation of the legality of Russian foreign policy under international 
law and seek to illuminate the potential repercussions on security and 
global stability effectuated by the first eighteen months of Russo-
Ukrainian hostilities. 
I. UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: A COMPLICATED PAST 
A brief history of the longstanding relationship between Ukraine 
and Russia is required to be able to fully understand the complex geo-
ethnic factors driving these conflicts. The strategic Crimean Peninsula 
has been a geopolitical focal point of European empires for centuries. The 
eastern oblasts (provinces) of Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, sit on the 
Donets River Basin and are notable for their large coal reserves.8  The 
region was once a part of the 18th century imperial Russian territory 
 
 5. Red Cross officially declares Ukraine civil war, THE LOC. (Jul. 23, 2014, 5:09 PM CT), 
http://www.thelocal.ch/20140723/red-cross-declares-civil-war-in-ukraine. 
 6. Putin reveals secrets of Russia’s Crimea takeover plot, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226. 
 7. See U.N. Report, Escalation of hostilities has exacerbated civilian suffering, OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 15, 2017) http://www.ohchr.org/EN
/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21383&LangID=E. 
 8. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Donets Basin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.britannica.com/place/Donets-Basin. 
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known as Novorossiya, which stretched to the Black Sea.9  The history 
between the two nations dates back to the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, and 
since then Ukraine has only enjoyed statehood independent from Russia 
during periods of war or revolution – e.g., the final days of World War I 
in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, and then in the period 
surrounding the dissolution of the USSR.10 
The Hetmanate was a 17th century militocracy that at its peak 
encompassed about half of modern Ukraine as well as parts of Russia and 
Poland.  Although it was crushed by the Russian Empire, the Cossack 
warriors who defended Ukraine’s independence left behind a distinctive 
folklore and Ukrainian identity.11  The process, which created the borders 
of modern Ukraine, was a result of Russian geopolitical expansion in the 
18th and 19th centuries.  Tsarist Russia consistently warred with the 
Ottoman Empire from its territory on the north coast of the Black Sea.12  
In 1783, Catherine the Great declared she was protecting ethnic Russians 
in Crimea from the Ottoman Empire and annexed the territory.13  Through 
war, colonization, and the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population, the 
Crimean peninsula became a vital part of the Russian empire. 
In the early decades of the 19th century, the Tsar set up a university 
in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev to develop Ukrainian nationalism in order 
to reduce Polish influence in the region.14  Instead, it led to the emergence 
of a nationalist revolutionary fervor that subsequently attracted severe 
persecution from the Tsar.15  The students at the University of Kiev 
played a significant role in these movements, so in the late 19th century 
the Russian government prohibited Ukrainian from being spoken by 
 
 9. Christian Caryl, Novorossiya is Back From the Dead, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/17/novorossiya-is-back-from-the-dead. 
 10. Charles Emmerson, Ukraine and Russia’s History Wars, HIST. TODAY (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.historytoday.com/charles-emmerson/ukraine-and-russia’s-history-wars; see also 
Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKRAINE  (2001) 
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CP%5CE%5CPereiaslav
Treatyof1654.htm. 
 11. Katya Gorchinskaya, Revolutions Without Benefits, THE AM. INT. (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/12/01/revolutions-without-benefits. 
 12. Emmerson, supra note 10 at 3. 
 13. Christopher Spencer, Ukraine Crimea Crisis: The History, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 
2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/ukraine-crimea-crisis-the-history. 
 14. David Keys, Complex Crimea: the history behind the relationship between Russia and 
Ukraine over Crimea, BBC HIST. MAG. (May 2011), http://www.historyextra.com/feature/
complex-crimea-history-relationship-Russia-Ukraine-Crimea. 
 15. Richard Antony French, Kiev, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.britannica.com/place/Kiev. 
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teachers in the classroom and banned educational, scholarly, and 
religious publications in Ukrainian.16 
The European powers of the mid-19th century, led by Britain, feared 
continued Russian expansion east, particularly now that they had a major 
naval base in Sevastopol on the Black Sea.17  In response, they attempted 
to shore up the Ottoman Empire’s buffer zone between Western Europe 
and Russia by closing the Bosporus and Dardanelles to all warships (and 
thus closing access to the Mediterranean).18  This sparked the 1854 
Crimean War, where the Anglo-French-Ottoman force destroyed 
Sevastopol and humiliated Tsar Nicholas’ army.19  Although the key port 
towns of Crimea were returned to Russia, the peace agreement 
established that Russia would not maintain any naval or military bases on 
Black Sea, greatly weakening Russia as a threat to the Ottomans or 
Western Europe.20 
World War I was devastating for Russia. Of the nearly 10 million 
troops mobilized, over a third were wounded or killed.21  After a period 
of mass surrenders and desertions, the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917 overtook the incompetent tsarist regime and the Provisional 
Government that followed the Tsar’s abdication.  While the fledgling 
Bolshevik government engaged in peace negotiations with Germans, in 
Ukraine, a “governing council” known as the Rada was having trouble 
with the local Bolshevik movement.22  Germany, with forces near the 
region, acted first and effectuated the authority of the Rada by supplying 
food and aid to its supporters.23  Germany then forced the Bolshevik 
government to sign a treaty that recognized the independence of 
Ukraine.24  German forces entered Kiev in March 1918 and proclaimed 
Ukraine to be a sovereign State.25  Yet soon after, Imperial Germany 
collapsed, and a civil war engulfed much of Russia, with Crimea 
changing hands several times over the next three years.26  In 1921, the 
 
 16. Id.  See also Walter G. Moss, The 20 Things You Need to Know to Understand What’s 
Happening in Ukraine, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 28, 2014), http://historynewsnetwork.org/
article/155451. 
 17. William R. Polk, What’s Behind the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine?, HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK (Dec. 21, 2014), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/157941. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and the autonomous 
Crimean Republic was recognized as a homeland for the Crimean Tatars; 
both officially as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR).27  However, western Ukraine became part of the newly 
constructed state of Poland.28 
The darkest period of Ukrainian history may have been the 1930s 
when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin orchestrated mass executions and 
perpetuated a state-induced famine, known as the Holodomor, which 
killed as many as ten million people.29  Afterward, millions of Russians 
and other nationalities were forcibly transported to repopulate the 
resource-rich eastern regions.30  Consequently, World War II was critical 
for Ukraine as it served as a buffer zone between the German Wehrmacht 
and the Russian heartland.31  Nearly one-sixth of the Ukrainian population 
died during the war, totaling over 5.3 million.32  When the Nazis and 
Soviets divided Poland in 1939, they reunited Western Ukraine with 
Eastern Ukraine.33 This agreement eventually fueled Ukraine’s later 
desire for nationhood.34 
During the war, Ukraine was a prime economic target of Germany 
as the “bread basket” of Russia.35  When the Germans captured Kiev, they 
siphoned off food and shipped 2.5 million Ukrainians to German slave 
labor camps.36  Stalin also ordered the deportation of the 200,000 Muslim 
Crimean Tartars.37  Tens of thousands of ethnic Russians were then settled 
on the peninsula.38 At this point, while geographically considered an 
extension of Ukraine, the ethnopolitical ties of Crimea were 
overwhelming with Russia.  In the closing days of WWII, Stalin chose 
Yalta in Crimea as the place for the Allies to redraw the map of Europe.39  
Less than a decade later, Ukraine-born USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev 
 
 27. See Serhy Yekelchyk, The Ukrainian Crisis: In Russia’s Long Shadow, OHIO ST. U. 
ORIGINS (Jun. 2014), http://origins.osu.edu/article/ukrainian-crisis-russias-long-shadow.  See also 
Keys, supra note 14. 
 28. See Moss, supra note 16, at 5. 
 29. See Theunis Bates, Ukraine’s Fraught Relationship with Russia: A Brief History, THE 
WK. (Mar. 8, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russia-
brief-history; See also Moss, supra note 16. 
 30. See Bates, supra note 27. 
 31. See Polk, supra note 17. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Polk, supra note 17. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Keys, supra note 14. 
 38. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25. 
 39. See Polk, supra note 17. 
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transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Satellite Republic in 
celebration of the anniversary of the 1654 Pereiaslav Treaty.40  At the 
time, it was impossible to know that Ukraine’s borders would one day 
become sovereign international borders. 
Geo-ethnic factions could still be seen in the makeup of the country 
with the formal dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and recognition of 
Ukraine’s declaration of independence.41  The western part of Ukraine 
leaned towards the European Union, whereas the industrial southeast 
consisted of Russian-speaking pro-communist factions of nostalgic 
Kremlin supporters.42  In its brief period of post-Soviet independence, 
Ukraine has been wrought with political corruption and a comprehensive 
need for economic reform.  Ethnic and political tensions have perpetuated 
several regime changes, particularly in the past decade as pro-Russia and 
pro-European regimes seemingly exchanged places in Kiev. 
In spite of the growing desire for European integration in Ukraine 
in the early 2000s, pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych (born in 
Soviet Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast) won the 2004 presidential election.43  
However, reports of massive election fraud and rigged ballots spurred 
mass protests in Kiev and other major western cities in what came to be 
known as the Orange Revolution.44  Viktor Yuschenko, a pro-European 
candidate who had been the victim of an attempted assassination via 
poisoning during the election campaign won the second monitored 
election run-off.45  Putin openly sided with the defeated regime in the 
aftermath of the Orange Revolution, perpetuating the imperial Russian 
past and further dividing Ukraine’s eastern and western factions.46  The 
failure of the subsequent pro-West leaders resulted in Yanukovych’s 
comeback, and in 2010 he was elected president.47 
The key to this complex history is that there are two competing 
narratives of the Russo-Ukrainian imperial rise and fall: a distinct, 
differing Ukrainian view and a Russian view.  To Russia, Ukraine has 
lost perspective of the two countries’ shared history and no longer 
 
 40. See Spencer, supra note 13. 
 41. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Stuart Williams, Ukraine’s ‘Orange Villain’ seeks last laugh, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 
12, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6973451/Ukraines-Orange-villain-seeks-
last-laugh.html. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  See also Yuschenko and the poison theory, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4041321.stm. 
 46. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25. 
 47. Id. 
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cherishes their supporting role in Russia’s greatness.48  Ukrainians have 
embraced a narrative based in national independence and resistance to 
imperial domination by Moscow.  While the 1939 incorporation of 
Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union is seen by Russia to be a 
reunification of a lost territory, Ukrainian nationalists see it more as the 
beginning of a 50-year Soviet occupation that ended in 1991.49  With this 
nuanced history in mind, the last few years of political and military crises 
can now be analyzed in detail. 
II. RUSSIA’S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
A. Background 
Several major events prefaced the 2014 annexation of Crimea that 
will help shed light on Russia’s reasons for violating Ukraine’s territorial 
sovereignty.  In November 2013, public support began to grow for anti-
government protests throughout western Ukraine, with the most public 
demonstrations occurring in the capital city of Kiev at Maidan 
Nezalezhonsti or “Independence Square.”50  The pro-Moscow President 
Yanukovych had a longstanding history of corruption, repression and 
anti-Western policies which stood at odds with Ukrainian popular 
sentiment.51  When he refused to sign a Trade Association Agreement 
with the European Union that would create closer economic ties between 
Ukraine and Western Europe, protests in Kiev grew larger, more radical 
in opposition to the regime, and eventually more violent.52  On February 
20, 2014, these protests reached a boiling point as eighty-eight people 
were killed in forty-eight hours, including some by uniformed snipers 
shooting protestors from rooftops.53  Two days later, President 
Yanukovych fled Ukraine after protest leaders and other members of the 
Ukrainian political elite agreed to form a new government and hold fresh 
elections.54 
 
 48. See Emmerson, supra note 10. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Adam Taylor, Why Ukraine is So Important, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-ukraine-is-so-important-2014-1. 
 51. See Maxim Tucker, Ukraine pro-EU protests: ‘It’s not a rally, it’s a revolution’, THE IND. 
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-pro-eu-protests-police-
forced-to-flee-as-demonstrators-take-over-central-kiev-8975954.html. 
 52. See Lizzie Dearden, Ukraine Crisis: A timeline of the conflict from the Euromaidan 
protests to MH17 and civil war in the east, THE IND. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-a-tim. . .-the-euromaidan-protests-to-
mh17-and-civil-war-in-the-9706999.html. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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On March 16, 2014, a referendum on the status of the Ukrainian 
territory of Crimea was held.55  Two choices were proffered to the citizens 
of Crimea: either restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and its status as 
a territory of Ukraine, or formally sever ties to Kiev and join the Russian 
Federation.56  According to the Russian state media, voter turnout was 
81.3%, and 96.7% of the votes were cast in favor of annexation by 
Russia.57  Within three days, President Putin signed an Executive Order 
recognizing an autonomous Republic of Crimea, and concluded a treaty 
on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation.58  
The conflict was spurred by the so called “Euromaidan” (referencing the 
protests in Kiev’s Maidan Square) and the preceding months of protests 
leading to a change of regime in Kiev.59 
On February 27, pro-Russian militias seized government 
headquarters and parliament in Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula, raising the 
Russian flag over two buildings in the capital city, Simferopol.60  
Throughout the next week, armed men in military uniform, lacking any 
insignia (referred to as “little green men” by Western press and the “polite 
men” by Putin) made their presence known throughout key Crimean 
cities, government buildings, and airports.61  The Kremlin initially denied 
the presence of overt Russian military, but as masked gunmen surrounded 
Ukrainian military installations and administrative buildings, it became 
more difficult for Russian authorities to maintain any plausible 
deniability of involvement.  At the time, Moscow referred to the 
paramilitary presence as “self-defense” groups, but later Putin admitted 
that there was indeed Russian Special Forces acting in an operational 
capacity.62  Some of these soldiers were already present at the naval base 
in Sevastopol under previous basing agreements.  However, they were 
 
 55. See Grant, supra note 1, at 19. 
 56. Id. at 16. 
 57. Id. at 17-18. 
 58. Id. at 19-20. 
 59. Dearden, supra note 50. 
 60. See Heather Saul, Ukraine crisis: Armed men hoist Russian flag after seizing Crimea 
Parliament, THE IND. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-
crisis-armed-men-hoist-russian-flag-after-seizing-crimea-parliament-9156413.html. 
 61. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green men” or “Russia invaders”?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154. 
 62. Aleksander Vasovic & Mike Colle-White, Crimea prepares for referendum under heavy 
military presence, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/15/us-
ukraine-crisis-crimea-idUSBREA2E09R20140315#hWXScmfuR1XFKkOx.97; Putin reveals 
secrets of Russia’s Crimea takeover plot, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-31796226. 
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deployed throughout the territory and seized effective control of the 
region by the time of the referendum.63 
B. Annexation 
The day after the referendum was held, the Russian President passed 
an executive order that recognized “the Republic of Crimea as a 
sovereign and independent state, whose city of Sevastopol has a special 
status.”64  On March 18, he announced the “Crimean State Council” and 
the “Sevastopol Legislative Assembly” had proposed joining the Russian 
Federation, and signed an executive order titled “On Executing the 
Agreement on Admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation.” 65 On March 19, a bill “On Accession of the Republic of 
Crimea to the Russian Federation and the Creation of New Constitution 
Entities within Russia” was submitted to the State Duma, the lower house 
of the Russian legislature.66  The annexation was formalized in Russian 
law in the Federal Constitution on March 21, 2014.67 
No domestic Ukrainian law or treaty between Russia and Ukraine 
allowed for a transfer of territory; no negotiation occurred between the 
State governments or the putative authorities of Crimea; and Ukraine did 
not accede to any separation of Crimea from its territory.68  In fact, the 
Ukrainian parliament formally declared the referendum to be void and 
legally invalid.69  Since that time, Crimea’s annexation has been decried 
by multiple international organizations (e.g., The Council of Europe, 
European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
NATO, UN General Assembly), nearly all of Europe, and the United 
States.70  The proceeding analysis will explain how this annexation was a 
violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and an illegal use of force under 
various UN doctrines, customary international law, international treaties, 
and domestic constitutions. 
 
 63. See Grant, supra note 1, at 7. 
 64. Id. at 19. 
 65. Id. at 19-20. 
 66. Id. at 20. 
 67. Id. at 20. 
 68. Id. at 23. 
 69. Id. at 17. 
 70. Jari Tanner, Europe lawmakers condemn Russian action in Crimea, Ukraine, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 9, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1786f6bca6eb4e4b99e45
81034e5ffd0/europe-lawmakers-condemn-russian-actions-crimea-ukraine. 
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C. UN Doctrines 
The internationally recognized guidelines for the use of force can be 
found in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  The UN Charter was agreed 
upon in the immediate aftermath of World War II and was intended to be 
a foundational treaty governing relations between States.71  Article 2(4) 
is the governing principle for the use of force, requiring all members to 
“refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”72  
The presence of masked militia and deployment of thousands of troops 
in the sovereign territory of another State, on the eve of a critical political 
referendum, thus appears to be in violation of the type of force prohibited 
in Article 2(4). 
In 1970, a UN General Assembly Resolution, the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations was passed, affirming the vital Charter principles of territorial 
sovereignty and respect of State boundaries.73  After Russia vetoed the 
UN Security Council draft resolution denouncing the annexation, the UN 
General Assembly considered the conflict.74  The General Assembly 
referred to the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations in their non-
binding resolution published March 27, 2014 entitled “Territorial 
integrity of Ukraine.”75  The 1970 resolution is recognized as a 
fundamental source of international law, and the 2014 resolution 
reaffirmed that 
“the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another 
State resulting from the threat or use of force, and that any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of a State or country or of its political independence 
is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”76 
 
 71. U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Sergey Sayapin, The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 In the Context 
of General International Law, 2 EUR. POL. & L. DISCOURSE VOL 19, 19 (2015) 
http://www.academia.edu/11807900/The_United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_
68_262_in_the_Context_of_General_International_Law. 
 74. See generally Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea 
referendum invalid, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=47443#.Vle6x9AqhAQ. 
 75. See Sayapin, supra note 69, at 26. 
 76. Id. at 23. 
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Although UN General Assembly resolutions are not binding, they 
reflect existing customary international norms or treaty law.77  
Additionally, though the UN Charter dictates that the Security Council 
bears the “primary responsibility” for maintaining international peace 
and security, UN Security Council member, Russia, is currently a direct 
participant in the conflict.78  Thus, the General Assembly’s consideration 
of the Crimea issue may hold more legal significance, particularly as it 
appears to be focused on reaffirming existing principles of State 
sovereignty.79  Again, Russia’s actions in Crimea seem to fit into this 
prohibited category of “use of force” aimed at the “disruption of national 
unity and territorial integrity of a State.” 
The crime of aggression was not initially codified into the UN 
Charter in 1945 because member States had trouble agreeing on a 
definition or conditions of “aggression,” since no such crime existed at 
the time the Charter was drafted.80  In 1974, General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression was passed, and it 
included “…any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another 
State or part thereof.”81  While aggression was listed as a crime in the 
1998 Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, 
the 1974 definition of aggression was not codified into the Statute until 
2010 at a review conference in Kampala.82  Both the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine are signatories to the earlier treaty, but are not parties to the 
updated 2010 articles.83  Article 8 bis of the updated Rome Statute 
referred to the 1974 GAR 3314 to help define crimes of aggression, 
including using its explicit language in section 2(a), which mandates that 
States refrain from “any military occupation, however temporary,…or 
any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State.”84  
However, the crime of aggression cannot be a charge levied against 
Russia as it is not yet a State party to the updated procedural language. 
Although it is unclear how a “crime of aggression” will be fully 
prosecuted, and could not be done so until after 2017, the newly 
 
 77. Id. at 20. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Grant, supra note 1, at 12. 
 81. Id. at 12. 
 82. The Crime of Aggression, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited Dec. 2015). 
 83. See generally The Rome Statute in the World, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 
10, 2011), https://www.iccnow.org/documents/signatory_chart_Nov_2011_EN.pdf. 
 84. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 8 bis 2(a) (2010), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/add16852-aee9-4757-abe7-
9cdc7cf02886/283503/romestatuteng1.pdf. 
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incorporated crime of aggression cannot apply to Russia as it currently 
stands today.85  Thus, while the use of force in Crimea does appear to 
violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the non-binding 1974 
definition of aggression, Russia does not appear to be liable for a crime 
aggression as it is currently defined.  However, this does not legitimatize 
the violation of territorial sovereignty or use of force that the UN General 
assembly condemned. 
D. State Treaties, Diplomatic Pacts, and International Agreements 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula is a demonstrable 
violation of several major international treaties and agreements to which 
the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation were signatories: the 1975 
Helsinki Accords and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe Final Act; the 1991 Belavezha Accords; the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum; the Statute of the Council of Europe (which Russia joined 
in 1996); the 1997 bilateral Treaty of Friendship; and the 1997 Partition 
Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet.  Each of these 
pacts emphasized respect of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty in one form 
or another, and each was violated by Russia’s political and military 
actions in Crimea in March 2014. 
Both Ukraine and Russia are signatories to the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted as 
part of the 1975 Helsinki Accords.86  The act sought to promote the Cold 
War era policy of détente between East and West, and outlined vital 
principles of European State sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and 
noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.87  It mandated that 
States shall refrain from “any demand for, or act of, seizure and 
usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.”88  
Signed by thirty-five countries, the accord was actually seen at the time 
as a diplomatic victory for Moscow.89  This is because the agreement 
appeared to legitimize Soviet suzerainty across Eastern Europe and 
prevented any prospective challenge to its vast territorial borders.  
However, the Helsinki Accords now sanctify post-Cold War borders and 
 
 85. See generally The Crime of Aggression, supra note 78. 
 86. Spencer Kimball, Bound by Treaty: Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraine-and-crimea/a-17487632. 
 87. Brian Whitmore, RIP Helsinki Accords, RADIO FREE EUR. (Jul. 30, 2015), 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/27161370.html. 
 88. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Russia, Ukraine, and International Law, FOUND. ROBERT 
SCHUMAN (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-344-
en.pdf. 
 89. Whitmore, supra note 83, at 2. 
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protects the inviolability of Moscow’s former satellite states.90  Article IV 
of the Accords prohibits States from “making each other’s territory the 
object of military occupation, or other direct or indirect measures of 
force…no such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.”91  
Thus, Russia’s military deployment in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea 
appears to be a violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and therefore 
the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords. 
The 1991 Belavezha Accords accompanied the break-up of the 
USSR and the creation of the succeeding entity, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.92  The dissolution was prompted by a secret 
agreement between the presidents of three out of the fifteen Soviet 
republics, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.93  The agreement was conducted 
behind the back of the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, and the 
parties agreed to accept and respect the territorial integrity and the 
inviolability of each State’s borders.94  President Putin has belittled this 
agreement as a betrayal of ethnic Russians, stating that “millions of 
Russians went to bed in one country and woke up in another.”95  In 
December 1991, eight more former Soviet republics joined the treaty.96  
While there is debate about the legal legitimacy of the Accords, as a party 
to the agreement, the Russian Federation was in violation of its terms 
when its military deployed throughout Crimea and subsequently annexed 
the region in March 2014. 
In December 1994, a non-nuclear proliferation agreement was 
concluded among Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Ukraine97  The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances resulted 
in Ukraine yielding possession of its 1,800 nuclear warheads in exchange 
for international guarantees of its borders, including Crimea.98  The 
agreement prohibited uses of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all former 
 
 90. Id at 3. 
 91. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe art. IV, Aug. 1, 
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm. 
 92. The Belavezha Accords signed, PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY (Dec. 8, 1991), 
http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/history/Pages/Item.aspx?itemid=749. 
 93. See generally Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See President Vladimir Putin, Address at the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 
 96. See The Belavezha Accords signed, supra note 88. 
 97. See generally Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances 1994, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 5, 1994), http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-
disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484. 
 98. See Giuliani, supra note 84, at 3. 
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Soviet republics with a nuclear weapons infrastructure.99  Since the 
Budapest Memorandum’s very basis was an “explicit Russian guarantee” 
of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it has been referred to by multiple world 
leaders whence condemning Russia’s actions in the Crimea.100  The 
agreement called for parties to seek guidance from the UN Security 
Council to provide assistance if “Ukraine should become a victim of an 
act of aggression;” however, this is clearly an ineffective solution given 
Moscow’s position as a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security 
Council.101  Russia has blamed the US for violating this agreement by 
instigating the Euromaidan “coup” in Ukraine, and has accused 
Washington, without evidence, of arming and funding the opposition to 
Yanukovych.102  However, in bypassing UN Security Council permission 
and annexing sovereign Ukraine territory, Russia’s actions constituted a 
violation of the Budapest Memorandum’s main tenets. 
In 1996, Russia joined the forty-seven nation Council of Europe, a 
body that governs several international courts and assemblies, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights.103  At that time, it became a party to 
the Statute of the Council of Europe.  The organization was founded in 
1949, by the Treaty of London, with the goal of unifying European States 
to discuss political relations and promote fundamental principles of 
human rights and international law.104  The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE) is made up of representatives of member 
states’ parliaments and a Council of Foreign Ministers.  Since its 
formation, the Council of Europe has passed over 200 legally binding 
European treaties and conventions.105  In January 2015, the Parliamentary 
Assembly suspended Russia from participation in the Assembly’s bodies, 
citing their violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe and declaring 
the annexation of Crimea to be an illegal violation of international law.106  
The Assembly referred to the previously discussed UN Charter, the 
 
 99. See Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994, supra note 93 
 100. Stephen Chase & Mark MacKinnon, Harper leads charge to expel Russia from G8, ramp 
up sanctions, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/harper-leads-charge-to-expel-russia-from-g8-ramp-up-sanctions/article17631725. 
 101. See Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994, supra note 93. 
 102. See Andrew Higgins & Peter Baker, Russia Claims U.S. Is Meddling Over Ukraine, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0. 
 103. Luke Harding, Russia delegation suspended from Council of Europe over Crimea, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/russia-suspended-
council-europe-crimea-ukraine. 
 104. Council of Europe, CIVITAS (2014), http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSINST/
IN7.php. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Giuliani, supra note 84, at 2. 
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Helsinki Accords, and the commitments made to the organization when 
Russia joined in 1996.107 
In 1997, Russia and Ukraine agreed to enter into two bilateral 
treaties dealing with another legacy of the Soviet breakup – the 
disposition of the Black Sea Fleet that was part of the Soviet Navy and 
based in Crimea.108  The first treaty Moscow and Kiev signed was the 
‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Ukraine 
and the Russia Federation.’  Article 2 articulated “respect [of] each 
other’s territorial integrity” and the “inviolability of the borders” between 
them.109  Later that year, the ‘Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions 
of the Black Sea Fleet’ was signed, emphasizing the respect of each 
State’s borders, including an explicit statement that “Crimea is legally 
and territorially a sovereign part of Ukraine.”110  In return, Ukraine 
allowed Russia to lease one the largest operational naval bases in the 
world in the port city Sevastopol (renewed in 2010 to last until 2042).111  
The treaty allowed Russia to maintain up to 25,000 troops, 132 armored 
combat vehicles, and 24 pieces of artillery at the facilities on the Crimean 
base.112 
However, there were also crucial limitations on Russian military 
behavior.  The military forces could only operate “beyond their 
deployment sites” after coordinating with Ukraine’s administrative 
agencies.113  Also, the military forces had to “respect the sovereignty of 
Ukraine, honor its legislation, and preclude interference in the internal 
affairs of Ukraine.”114  One week after the annexation of Crimea, Putin 
submitted proposals to the State Duma terminating the legal effect of 
several Russo-Ukrainian agreements, including this treaty.115  Russia’s 
actions appear to be in direct violation of the 1997 treaty, as Moscow 
deployed the Sevastopol-based troops to seize control of crucial Crimean 
territory on the eve of a political referendum.116 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Tyler Felgenhauer, Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords, DEF. 
TECHNICAL INFO. CENTER at 1 (Feb. 26, 1999), http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a360381.pdf. 
 109. See Kimball, supra note 82. 
 110. See Felgenhauer, supra note 102. 
 111. See Kimball, supra note 82. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Putin submits proposals on denouncing some Russia-Ukraine agreements on Black Sea 
Fleet, TASS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/russia/725725. 
 116. Michael Kofman & Matthew Rojansky, A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”, 
KENNAN CABLE (Apr. 2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-
KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf. 
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E. Domestic Constitutions 
The Constitution of Ukraine makes explicit references to the 
territorial sovereignty of Crimea, the process for referendums of a “local 
character,” and the lawful process for proposed changes to border of 
Ukraine’s territory.117  Four main articles were violated by the 
government of Crimea in conducting a referendum to determine 
Ukraine’s territorial boundaries. 
Chapter XI of the Constitution addresses the territorial structure of 
Ukraine.  Article 134 states that the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea is 
an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine.”118  Article 135 discusses the 
Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and dictates that it 
“shall not contradict the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.”119  Under 
Article 138, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was within its rights to 
organize and conduct a local referendum.120  However, under Article 73, 
any issues that involve “altering the territory of Ukraine are exclusively 
solved by an All-Ukrainian referendum.”121  Article 157 prohibits 
amendments to the Constitution that violate the “territorial indivisibility” 
of Ukraine.122  When the issue was submitted to the Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine, they affirmed that only an all-Ukrainian referendum could 
address a change to State boundaries.123  The Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe considered the referendum in an opinion, and held that 
the Ukrainian Constitution clearly prohibited a local referendum from 
altering its territory.124  Thus, the March 2014 referendum to break away 
from the Ukraine violated four main tenants of the Ukrainian 
Constitution, confirmed in both State Constitutional Court and an 
advisory body that specializes in constitutional law. 
The Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was also 
violated when a local referendum was conducted in a manner inconsistent 
with the Constitution of Ukraine.  Under Article 28, all statutory acts 
passed in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea must conform to the 
Constitution of Ukraine.125  The four Articles that were discussed above 
were all in direct contradiction to the actions taken by the government of 
 
 117. See Grant, supra note 1, at 16. 
 118. UKR. CONST. art. 134, http://www.infoukes.com/history/constitution/index-en.html#r9. 
 119. Id. art. 135. 
 120. Id. at Ch. X Art. 138. 
 121. Id. at Ch. III Art. 73. 
 122. Id. at Ch. XIII Art. 157. 
 123. See Grant, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
 124. Id. at 17. 
 125. Venice Commission Opinion No. 762 (2014) at 9 (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD (2014)002-e. 
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Crimea.  Because it was outside of the local government’s scope of 
authority to violate the Ukrainian Constitution, the referendum to change 
Ukraine’s boundaries violated the Constitution of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea.126 
Russia’s Constitution had dictated since 2001 that the procedure for 
admitting a new subject to the Russian Federation was based on a mutual 
accord between the Russian Federation and the relevant State, had to take 
place pursuant to an international treaty between the two countries, and 
be initiated by a request from the foreign State.127  From the way the 
Constitution was worded, it would have been problematic to allow 
Crimea to accede to the Russian Federation as it was not recognized as 
an independent State and the request was not initiated by Ukraine.  
However, on February 28, 2014, a bill was introduced to the State Duma, 
On Amending the Federal Constitutional Law on the Procedure of 
Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject 
within the Russian Federation.128  The key amendment within the bill 
removed the requirement of “mutual accord” between the Russian 
Federation and the foreign state and the conclusion of an international 
treaty between two states.129  Once implemented, a foreign State’s 
admission would be carried out solely on the basis of the constitutional 
law of the Russian Federation.130  Keep in mind, this law was submitted 
as Russian military forces are being deployed throughout the territory of 
Crimea.  Hence, it appears the bill was submitted in a direct attempt to 
circumvent existing constitutional barriers in anticipation of the 
annexation process. 
Yet, under Art. 15(4) of Russia’s Constitution, universally 
recognized norms of international law and international treaties 
supersede any Russian Federation law that may be contradictory.131  
Accordingly, a domestic law voiding the legal process for territorial 
acquisitions based in prior treaty agreements between Ukraine and Russia 
would not be legitimate in light of its contradictory nature to standing 
international law.  The Constitution of Ukraine, the Constitution of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation until late February, 2014 (and possibly after), were thus 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Venice Commission Opinion No. 763 (2014), at 7 (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD (2014)004-e. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 3. 
 130. Id. at 3. 
 131. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION], 
http://constitution.garant.ru/english. 
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violated by both the Crimean and Russian government actions that 
resulted in Crimea’s referendum to become a federal subject of Russia. 
F. Russia’s Legal Arguments 
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a major 
international power, Russia has the ability to shape global interpretations 
of international law.  Thus, it is significant to attempt to give credence to 
the legal rhetoric the Kremlin espoused for their actions in Crimea.  Five 
of Putin’s legal arguments will be analyzed in turn: (1) the historic right 
Russia maintains over Crimea allowed for a referendum to determine a 
legitimate vote for the “self-determination” of the Crimean people and 
thus was a valid act of unilateral secession;132 (2) the human rights of the 
ethno-Russian minority resident in Crimea were threatened by an 
oppressive nationalist regime;133 (3) Russia’s intervention was at the legal 
invitation of the illegally ousted President Yanukovych and the Prime 
Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;134 (4) there was a 
fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) resulting from 
a radical military coup that triggered a reexamination of treaty obligations 
to Ukraine;135 and (5) based on State practice embodied in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Kosovo decision and recent Western 
actions in Iraq and Libya, the use of force in Crimea was legitimate.136  
While there is some basis in State practice for Russia’s legal position, all 
five of these arguments will be shown to be of minimal legitimacy. 
G. Self Determination and Secession 
The first argument can be further dissected into two parts: that 
Russia’s historical right to Crimea legitimized the use of force in aid of 
‘self-determination;’ and that the act was thus a valid unilateral ‘remedial 
secession.’  The prohibition against the threat or use of force among 
States contains limited exceptions embodied in Article 51 of the UN 
 
 132. Grant, supra note 1, at 57. 
 133. Id. at 50. 
 134. See Roy Allison, Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke 
the rules, 90 INT’L AFF. 1255, 1264 (2014). 
 135. Boris N. Mamlyuk, Mapping Developments in Ukraine from the Perspective of 
International Law, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/
2014/03/12/mapping-developments-ukraine-perspective-international-law. 
 136. Id.; See also Valerie Pacer, Vladimir Putin’s justification for Russian action in Crimea 
undermines his previous arguments over Syria, Libya and Iraq, THE LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & 
POL. SCI. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/03/11/vladimir-putins-
justification-for-russian-action-in-crimea-undermines-his-previous-arguments-over-syria-libya-
and-iraq. 
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Charter, which recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense.”137  The right allows for a group of people to determine their 
own independent political, economic, social, and cultural status in limited 
scenarios.  The two key elements to analyze are the actions of the 
incumbent State and the responses of the international community.138  
There are two sets of circumstances where the UN Charter dictates self-
determination can entail a right for the people of a sovereign territory to 
establish a new State.139 
The first circumstance deals with decolonization regimes and was 
expressed through a series of UN General Assembly resolutions in 
1960.140  The resolutions declared the subjugation of colonial regimes to 
be a denial of fundamental human rights and allowed for a Non-Self 
Governing Territory to either declare independence as a State, freely 
associated with an independent State, or integrate with an independent 
State.141  However, this was limited to “colonial type” territories.142 
The other type of “self-determination” is the more controversial act 
of unilateral “remedial secession.”143  This is a contested concept, and 
even if valid it is considered a right that can only be invoked if the 
“incumbent State committed a serious breach of its obligations to the 
community,” such as the South African system of apartheid, or the 
violation of human rights in Kosovo.144  If the people of a territory are 
allowed to participate in government and are not being oppressed 
systematically, acts of secession are widely considered illegal.145  In an 
advisory opinion by the Canadian Supreme Court on the secession of 
Quebec, the Court made clear that because the people of Quebec were not 
“denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, 
economic, social and cultural development,” they did not enjoy a right 
under international law to effect unilateral secession.146  The Quebec 
decision also recognized a process of negotiation required with the 
incumbent State before a valid act of separation can occur, to determine 
if the issue can be settled under a national process.147 
 
 137. U.N. Charter, art. 51, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html. 
 138. Mamlyuk, supra note 131. 
 139. Grant, supra note 1, at 23-26. 
 140. Id. at 23. 
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 146. Gaiane Nuridzhanian, Crimean Secession: No Right to Divorce, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & 
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 147. Id. 
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According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), there was no military or human rights oppression 
perpetuated against the people of Crimea by the government in Kiev. 148  
This position was confirmed in the April 2014 “Report on the Human 
Rights Situation in Ukraine” by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR Report).149  Additionally, 
Crimea is not considered a “colonized” territory.150  After the UN Security 
Council conducted seven sessions on the situation in Crimea, Russia 
vetoed the draft resolution that urged countries not to recognize the 
results of the referendum.151  Subsequently, the UN General Assembly 
voted 100 to 11 with fifty-eight abstentions on a non-binding resolution 
with similar language to the Security Council’s draft, including language 
in favor of upholding the integrity of Ukraine’s borders and declaring the 
March 2014 referendum invalid.152 
The process of the referendum was itself of dubious legitimacy due 
to the substantial presence of armed pro-Russian forces replacing the 
normal government administration.  According to the UN High 
Commissioner of Human Rights “the presence of paramilitary and so 
called self-defense groups as well as soldiers without insignia… was also 
not conducive to an environment in which the will of voters could be 
exercised freely.”153  Constitutional referendums that hold enough 
significance as to determine State sovereignty are expected to be held in 
fair and monitored conditions.  If Russia sought a truly legal international 
resolution to the process of accepting Crimea as a federal subject to its 
territory, the referendum would not have been conducted “in haste, in a 
period of public crisis, and in the absence of third party observation.”154  
Accordingly, this does not appear to have been a valid act of ‘self 
determination’ by Crimea under international law. 
 
 148. Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on National 
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BODIE_ FINAL 08202017 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2017  1:59 PM 
288 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:2 
H. Human Rights 
Another popular Russian argument was based on the protection of 
co-ethnic Russians in Ukraine.  In response to the Kiev regime change, 
Putin stated that “those who opposed the coup were immediately 
threatened with repression.  Naturally, the first in line here was 
Crimea…we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress.”155  
Russian UN representative Vitaly Churkin asserted that “extremists in 
Ukraine must be prevented from taking control of the situation through 
illegitimate means, the use of violence and open terror.”156  However, as 
stated above, according to both the OSCE and the OHCHR Report, there 
has been little documented evidence of any form of oppression of the 
Crimean Russian ethno-linguist population.157  One example Russia cited 
occurred in the aftermath of President Yanukovych’s escape from 
Ukraine.  The Ukrainian Parliament sought to repeal the 2012 language 
law that permitted Ukrainian regions to make Russia an official second 
language.  However, a controversy over language rights does not seem to 
be the case for an armed humanitarian intervention, particularly in light 
of the principles of necessity and proportionality required for such a use 
of force.158  Moreover, the acting Ukraine President Turchynov declined 
to sign the act or approve of the Parliament’s decision to repeal the 
language law.159 
I. Intervention by Invitation 
Moscow’s argument that intervention in Crimea was at the legal 
invitation of both President Yanukovych and Prime Minister of Crimea 
Sergey Aksyonov is also undermined by governing international law.  On 
March 3, 2014 Russia submitted a statement to the UN Security Council, 
allegedly made by Yanukovych, requesting formal military aid from the 
Russian Federation to help restore law and order and protect the people 
of Ukraine in the aftermath of the “illegal seizure of power in Kyiv.”160  
 
 155. Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad, THE WASH. POST 
(Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protect-
the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html. 
 156. Allison, supra note 130, at 1262. 
 157. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 144, at 
21.  See also Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, supra note 143. 
 158. Allison, supra note 130. 
 159. See Antonello Tancredi, The Russian annexation of the Crimea: questions relating to the 
use of force, QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. (QIL) 5-34 (2014), http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-russian-
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The statement goes on to explain that “safety and human rights are under 
threat” and that “people are being persecuted on political and linguistic 
grounds.”161  This requires an analysis of whether President Yanukovych 
or Sergey Aksyonov had the legal standing to request such aid, and 
whether the Ukrainian Constitution would allow it, even if the request 
was legitimate. 
It is true that President Yanukovych’s sudden departure from 
Ukraine is perhaps of questionable legitimacy.  While he did abandon 
office and record an official statement of resignation, upon reaching 
safety outside of Ukraine he retracted his resignation and declared the 
Parliament vote that ousted him illegal.162  Three hundred and twenty-
eight members of the 450 seat parliament voted to remove Yanukovych, 
for reasons including his abandonment of his post and the high volume 
of deaths amassed in the Euromaidan protests.163  However, the February 
22, 2014 vote may not have been legal under constitutional guidelines 
that required a three-fourths majority (i.e., 338 votes) and a review by the 
Constitutional Court.164  In any event, the constitutionality of his 
impeachment does not alone provide a basis for the use of military force 
in Crimea.  Although the requirements for a government to issue a valid 
invitation to use force are not codified in international law, State practice 
and customary international law indicate that “effective control over a 
substantial area” is required for the inviting government.165 
International recognition is another factor to be considered, and 
Yanukovych’s claim of legitimacy rests purely on the recognition of the 
State that intervened.  The majority of the international community 
recognizes the transitional government in Kiev.166  Generally, it has been 
thought that recognition of the “intervening State alone usually cannot 
suffice to legalize or justify and intervention.”167  This can be seen in UN 
General Assembly Resolution 44/240 denouncing the US intervention in 
Panama.168  There, the US similarly tried to justify that its invitation to 
use force was at the behest of Guillermo Endara, who was only 
recognized by the US as the legitimate President of Panama and was in 
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exile on a US military base.169  It therefore appears that an invitation from 
a recognized interim government would be considered much more 
legitimate than the statements of a single deposed leader in exile 
recognized only by the intervening State. 
There are some scholars who believe a government “in exile could 
in some limited circumstances validly invite foreign troops onto the 
territory of their State despite having been deprived of effective 
control.”170  Such a case would require the sitting government to be 
recognized internationally as illegal.171  For example, the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait, while in exile, was not deprived of its right to 
request foreign assistance against Iraq as an aggressor in 1990.172  There, 
however, Kuwait’s government was recognized by a majority of the 
international community and the UN as the legitimate representative of 
its country.173  In contrast, the transitional Kiev government was not a 
forceful imposition by an outside power nor has it been found to 
persistently violate human rights.174  The majority of human rights 
violations found by the OHCHR Report, in fact, occurred under President 
Yanukvoych’s regime during the Euromaidan protests.175  After the Kiev 
regime change, there was no widespread international support 
recognizing Yanukovych as the legitimate government authority.176 
The US was also quick to dismiss the legality of Sergey Aksyonov’s 
request for intervention, stating that “the prohibition of the use of force 
would be rendered moot were sub-national authorities able to unilaterally 
invite military intervention by a neighboring state.”177  International law 
only recognizes the ability of regional governments to invite the use of 
military force in very limited situations, and in those situations the 
“author of an invitation…must be the highest available State organ in 
order to ensure that the state speaks with one voice.”178  Further evidence 
of Aksyonov’s request being illegitimate can be found in the ICJ’s 
Nicaragua judgment.  The court noted that “…it is difficult to see what 
would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if 
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intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government 
of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition.”179  
This undermines any legitimacy of a regional government’s invitation to 
use force. 
J. Coup d’état/ Rebus Sic Stantibus 
Yet another popular Kremlin argument accuses the Euromaidan 
protests of being an illegal Western-backed coup d’état of the 
democratically elected regime under President Yanukovych.180  Under 
this theory, Russia recognizes the fundamental change of circumstances, 
or rebus sic santibus, provision articulated in Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) allowing for a reexamination 
of obligations rising from previously conducted treaties, accords, and 
international agreements between Russia and Ukraine.181  Putin claims 
that the US “helped train the nationalists, their armed groups in Western 
Ukraine…” and that the West “facilitated the armed coup.”182  Thus, the 
interim government was illegal and Yanukovych remained the legal 
president of Ukraine. The argument then follows that all Russian treaties 
with Ukraine were void since they had been conducted with prior 
legitimate putative State authorities, including the bilateral friendship 
treaties prohibiting violations of territorial sovereignty.  The problem 
with this argument is that VCLT Art. 62(2) articulates that a 
“fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty (a) if the treaty establishes 
a boundary;…”183  Thus, a fundamental change of circumstances 
argument could not void the validity of the Budapest Memorandum, 
Helsinki Final Act, the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, or the Black Sea 
Fleet agreement, all of which emphasize respect of Ukraine’s borders and 
territory. 
K. Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya 
Moscow has also referred to the ICJ decision regarding Kosovo and 
recent State practice in both Iraq and Libya as precedent for the March 
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2014 use of force resulting in the annexation of Crimea.184  While the 
advisory opinion from the ICJ acknowledged Kosovo’s declared 
independence from Serbia legal, it evaded the question of whether the 
Kosovo population could secede as a manifestation of their right to self-
determination.  Putin has stated that the 2010 ICJ opinion on Kosovo was 
“a very similar situation” to the events that unfolded in Crimea.185  Like 
Crimea, Kosovo was an autonomous republic composed of a majority of 
citizens who belonged to an ethnic minority. The Kosovo Albanians 
feared Serbian oppression, as did (so the argument goes) ethnic Russians 
living in Crimea of the interim Kiev government.186  Under further 
examination, however, differences between the situations are quite stark. 
First, it should be noted that Russia vehemently opposed the 
recognition of Kosovo and the ICJ decision.  Russia claimed the 
declaration of independence from Serbia violated the UN Charter 
ensuring the territorial integrity of member nations and any recognition 
of Kosovo supported separatism.187  In fact, Russia issued a Written 
Statement in the Kosovo Advisory Proceedings, as follows: 
“[T]he Russian Federation is of the view that [international law] may 
be construed as authorizing secession under certain conditions. 
However, those conditions should be limited to truly extreme 
circumstances, such as an outright attack by the parent State, 
threatening the very existence of the people in question. Otherwise, all 
efforts should be taken in order to settle the tension between the parent 
State and the ethnic community concerned within the framework of 
the existing State.”188 
It does not appear Russia took all efforts to “settle the tension 
between the parent State and the ethnic community” in Crimea, as they 
rushed to conduct a referendum in the immediate aftermath of regime 
change without counseling the UN Security Council or other international 
governing bodies.189  The argument embracing territorial integrity of UN 
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member nations and anti-separatism fly in the very face of the rhetoric 
Moscow uses to legitimize the separation of Crimea.  Further, there has 
been little, if any, evidence of “truly extreme circumstances,” such as 
severe human rights abuses in Crimea, at least nowhere near the scale of 
what existed in Kosovo in the late 1990s.190 
Second, Crimea sought independence under the guise of following 
the Ukrainian Constitution, which explicitly prohibits any binding 
territory-altering referendum that was not held nation-wide.191  However, 
Kosovo was entitled under the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia with the 
right to secession.192  For instance, “[t]his right was exercised in a 1992 
referendum with a majority opting for secession and independence.”193  In 
response, Serbia did not recognize the vote and a campaign of violence 
and persecution ensued.194  From the time of NATO’s intervention in 
1999, it took eight whole years for independence to be declared.195  
During that period, Kosovo was under the administration of the UN and 
negotiations for a resolution were both peaceful and internationally 
supervised.196  Russia took a period of mere days and weeks to deploy 
stationed troops throughout Crimea, hold a dubious referendum under 
said military presence, and then formally annexed the territory.197  The 
UN Security Council vote on the legitimacy of the referendum was then 
vetoed by Russia, and the General Assembly voted 100-11 denouncing 
the action.198 
Third, the human rights abuses perpetuated against the Kosovars by 
Serbia were well documented.199  In 1998, the UN Security Council in 
Resolution 1199 acknowledged “excessive and indiscriminate use of 
force” by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army, resulting in “numerous civilian 
casualties” and the “displacement of over 230,000 persons from their 
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homes.”200  Russia voted in favor of this resolution, as did other Western 
members of the Council.201 However, there is neither evidence of 
numerous civilian casualties of the Crimean people perpetuated by the 
interim government in Kiev, nor evidence of the displacement of 
hundreds of thousands from their homes.202  Thus, while on the surface 
the two conflicts may share some basic characteristics, they are in reality 
quite different. The Russian attempt to use Western support for Kosovo’s 
independence is contrary to not only Moscow’s views regarding the case 
at the time, but does not appear to hold up as valid precedent based on the 
principles the opinion set down. 
Russia has also referred to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
2011 UN Security Council Resolution of 1973, which formed the basis 
for military intervention in the Libyan Civil War, to justify their 
actions.203  While these two conflicts were perhaps the most similar in 
their justifications to the conflict in Crimea, it is only because all three 
have been condemned as abuses of international law.  The 2003 invasion 
of Iraq was perpetuated by the US without explicit approval of the UN 
Security Council, and was denounced as a violation of the UN Charter by 
then UN secretary general Kofi Annan.204  In March 2011, the UN 
Security Council approved a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya and authorized ‘all 
necessary measures’ to protect civilians, with a vote of ten in favor to 
none against, with five abstaining (including Russia).205  Despite the 
concern for human rights in Libya, Putin called the resolution “flawed 
and inadequate,” because it allowed States to “take any action against a 
sovereign state.”206  At the time, it appeared he favored territorial 
sovereignty over humanitarian concerns.207  Yet when the argument is 
tailored to Crimea, Moscow appears to be comfortable with using the 
Western rhetoric it had decried just years ago.  Perhaps, in the early 
2000’s, it should have been foreseen that Western interventions under 
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dubious international law principles could have potential repercussions 
in the form of Russian mimicry. 
While the foregoing two examples of State practice are a minimal 
basis for Russia bypassing UN support for use of force in Crimea, the 
majority of Moscow’s legal rhetoric appears to be flawed.  In light of the 
multitude of UN doctrines and international agreements that support the 
territorial sovereignty of Ukraine and undermine the legitimacy of 
Crimea’s secession to Russia, combined with the minimal legitimacy 
shown to underscore Russia’s central legal arguments justifying use of 
force, the conclusion appears to be clear.  Russia’s military deployment 
in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in late February and early March 
2014 was an illegal use of force, while the March referendum and ensuing 
annexation was an illegitimate political act and a violation of Ukraine’s 
territorial sovereignty. 
III. CONFLICT IN THE DONBAS 
A. Background 
On April 6, 2014, just weeks after the annexation, armed men seized 
administration and security-service buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and 
Kharkiv, the three capitals of Ukraine’s eastern provinces.208  Within 
days, police and security-service buildings were overtaken by 
unidentified armed soldiers, local armed separatists, and regular 
civilians.209  As a result of the last three years of armed conflict between 
Ukraine’s government forces and the separatist militias, the UN estimates 
there have been over 9,000 casualties and between 2 and 3.5 million 
people displaced.210  Moreover, the fighting has seen violent peaks with 
quiet ceasefires, two failed peace agreements, and a multitude of 
accusations levied by both sides. 
The style of conflict Russia has perpetuated has been referred to as 
a “hybrid war” in Ukraine, via the proxy separatist forces in Donetsk and 
Luhansk, commonly referred to as the Donbas region of Ukraine.211  
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“Hybrid war” attempts to encapsulate a modern style of conflict, 
involving a mix of “non-state proxy fighters, heavy armor and artillery, 
drones, electronic warfare, and aggressive information operations” used 
by Russia to achieve tactical battlefield victories and broader political 
objectives.212  On December 1, 2015, NATO adopted a new hybrid 
warfare strategy in response to Russia’s actions in Crimea, but has yet to 
address the more violent, aggressive military action in the Donbas.213 
The term “hybrid warfare” does not necessarily represent a new 
ideology to Soviet or Russian foreign policy escapades.  For instance, 
maskirovka was a staple of Soviet military doctrine with its principal 
features including the maintenance of plausible deniability, concealment 
of forces, disinformation, denial, and decoy actions to confuse the 
opponents’ ability to predict and respond to actions.214  Additionally, the 
use of modern technology and strategy in connection with maskirovka 
has created a difficult to define style of conflict.  This style of warfare 
was foreshadowed by Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine and in the 2014 
iteration.  The doctrines include provisions for “integrated utilization of 
forces and resources of a non-military character,” “measures of 
information warfare in order to achieve political objectives,” 
“participation of irregular armed force elements and private military 
companies,” and the “use of indirect and asymmetric methods of 
operations.”215  These tactical strategies presaged today’s use of the term 
“hybrid war,” while outlining a path for Russia to perpetuate a violent 
geopolitical crisis without the attachment of direct responsibility for 
instigating an international armed conflict. 
While the conflict is most commonly characterized as a non-
international armed conflict, this section will show that between August 
2014 and January 2015, Russian involvement crossed the threshold of 
being an illegal use of force and initiated an international armed conflict. 
216  The situation in the Donbas is distinct from the situation in Crimea 
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because the territory is larger, pro-Moscow support is not as widespread, 
and there are no major local Russian military hubs.  Conversely, Crimea 
was a well-defined territory, contained a Russian military base which 
housed troops, and was made up of 77% Russian speaking citizens and 
58% ethnic Russians.217  The separatists only control portions of two 
Donbas oblasts, but neither in their entirety.  The ethnic population is 
more diverse and there are no Russian bases in Ukraine’s sovereign 
territory.  Russia’s documented and alleged military involvement in the 
Donbas will be analyzed below.  This section will show that the conflict 
should be characterized as an International Armed Conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine with a parallel Non-International Armed Conflict 
between Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists. 
B. Turning Points of Russian Involvement 
The Donbas separatist movement began as a combination of 
Ukrainian pro-Russian local activists and volunteer Russian militants 
active in the region.218  Local leaders were younger men who had been 
active in Russian nationalist groups in eastern Ukraine.219  Russian 
militants began arriving after the annexation of Crimea, and were often 
older, more experienced Russian military veterans who developed a 
working relationship with the younger radicals.220  For example, the 
Donetsk People’s Republic was proclaimed in April 2014 by ‘President’ 
Aleksander Bordai, a Russian political consultant from Moscow, and his 
Defense Minister, Igor “Strelkgov” Girkin.221  The EU believes that 
Girkin works for Russian military intelligence, GRU, and has ties to prior 
Russian military service in Chechnya, Serbia, and Transnistria.  Girkin is 
now considered the commander-in-chief of both the DPR and LPR, and 
has claimed responsibility for igniting the separatist movement with his 
military unit in April 2014.222  Russia believed that by providing 
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leadership, funding, and ammunition, local rebellions would thrive in 
destabilizing Kiev.223 
In April and May 2014, the separatist operation saw early success 
while the Kiev government was still in transition.224  On May 25, 2014, 
elections were held and the newly-elected President Poroshenko was 
sworn in June 7, 2014.225  Throughout the summer, Poroshenko began to 
ramp up Ukraine’s military operations against the separatists.226  
Consequently, Ukraine forces found success against the ill-equipped 
separatist militias and by mid-August 2014 had nearly encircled the 
remaining separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk.227 
At this point, the Kremlin stepped in to assist.  The Donetsk People’s 
Republic announced in August 2014 they had received 30 tanks, 120 
armored vehicles, and 1,200 troops from across the Russian border.228  
According to President Poroshenko and NATO satellite imagery, 
“columns of heavy artillery, huge loads of arms and regular Russian 
servicemen came to the territory of Ukraine from Russia through 
uncontrolled border areas.”229  Yet Russia continued to deny any Russian 
military presence in the region.230 
The bloodiest battle of 2014 was concluded on August 29 in the 
strategic city of Ilovaisk.  Ukraine troops had successfully beaten back 
separatists in nearby areas, and the assault was supposed to be the final 
drive to secure the city, which would cut crucial supply lines between the 
rebels of Donetsk and Russia’s border where support was flowing from.231  
There were approximately 100 separatists expected to remain in the 
city.232  Several days into the assault, an unexpectedly forceful counter-
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attack shocked the Ukraine troops.  Reports from the government forces 
show that 4,000 Russian infantry members had crossed the border, about 
half of which were heading to Ilovaisk.233  It was not a complete surprise, 
as Ukrainian forces had captured ten Russian paratroopers and a Russian 
tank throughout the course of the battle.234  However, the Russian forces 
and separatist rebels gradually surrounded the now-outnumbered 
Ukrainians, forcing a negotiation for safe passage back to Ukraine-held 
territory.  While the content of these talks has been disputed, what 
followed from them has not.  When the column of approximately four 
hundred Ukrainians waited to leave through a corridor outside the city, a 
rebel commander warned over radio communications that they would 
soon meet their deaths.235 
As the Ukrainian troop convoy began to exit the city and reached an 
open field to the south, they came upon Russian tanks and buried artillery 
that began to fire upon them at will. 236 Surviving Ukrainians were taken 
into Russian custody and passed to the rebels days later.237  Ukraine 
estimates that around 100 men were killed that day in the retreat.  
According to Ukraine’s military prosecutor, 366 troops were killed in 
total in the Battle of Ilovaisk (a number thought to be conservative.)238  
Russia denies any direct involvement with the battle, and claimed the 
captured paratroops had crossed the border by accident.239 
The Russian escalation prompted additional sanctions from the EU 
and spawned the Minsk Peace talks in early September, 2014.  
Representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian governments, separatist 
leaders, and a representative of the OSCE signed a ceasefire.240  Despite 
this, reports indicated continued heavy weaponry entering east 
Ukraine.241  A military operation seizing Donetsk Airport from Ukrainian 
forces in December was indicative of the rising violence between the 
forces. In the middle of January 2015, a critical battle broke out for the 
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railway hub of Debaltseve that lies between Donetsk and Luhansk.242  
Following a substantial Russian resupply of forces, the separatists were 
able to defend the city against Ukrainian troops.243  The violent skirmishes 
inspired a second round of peace talks, Minsk II, which called for a 
ceasefire to come into effect on February 15, 2015.244  While the ceasefire 
brought relief to some eastern Ukraine frontlines, the DPR rebel leaders 
announced that it did not apply to Debaltseve, and continued their 
shelling of thousands of trapped government troops until they were able 
to retreat.245 
While separatist soldiers did take part in the Battle of Debaltseve, 
documented evidence of Russian troops and powerful weaponry suggests 
both were pivotal factors in the fight.246  This included the 5th Tank 
Brigade from the Russian Ulan-Ude, Buryatia province and the 37th 
Motorized Infantry Brigade from Kyakhta, Buryatia.247  One soldier from 
the 5th Tank Brigade, Dorzhi Batomunkuyev, gave an interview with a 
Russian independent newspaper that contract soldiers from Kyakhta had 
joined him when crossing the border to fight in Debaltseve.248  Another 
Russia soldier, Bato Dambayev, trained with the 37th Motorized Infantry 
Brigade in the Russian Kuzminsky camp in December and January, 
crossed over the border with his brigade to fight battles in Debaltseve, 
and then returned home after the victory.249  A third Russian citizen and 
twenty-five year-old who has served multiple military terms with Russian 
forces, joined the separatists as a volunteer in 2014.250  In an interview 
with Radio Free Europe, he estimated that each separatist unit “has some 
15 volunteers from Russia” fighting for it.251  He also said that regular 
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Russian troops enter the Donbas for one week periods before leaving and 
being replaced by fresh forces. 252 
Russian weapons systems sighted in Debaltseve include the T-72B3 
Tank and the KamAZ-5350 Grad rocket launcher.253  Other Russian 
manufactured arms that have ‘appeared’ in the hands of the separatist 
military included shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank 
guided missiles, landmines, and certain small arms.254  The use of 
electronic warfare in Ukraine has also been effective; Russia has 
effectively jammed radar, GPS, and radio communications of the Ukraine 
government forces with sophisticated equipment.255 
In late September 2015, the Obama administration made the 
decision to send counter-battery radar for missiles to Ukraine, as long-
range Russian artillery was responsible for over 80% of Ukraine’s 
casualties.256  In early October, a positive meeting between French 
President Hollande, Ukraine President Poroshenko, German Chancellor 
Merkel, and President Putin resulted in the suspension of local elections 
in the DNR and LNR enclaves until January 2016, as well as the 
withdrawal of certain weaponry within fifteen kilometers from the line of 
contact.257  Putin was much more willing to cooperate than when the 
leaders had last met in January for the Minsk II talks in the midst of the 
Debaltseve violence.258 
This article was written in the fall and winter of 2015, but the war 
in Donbas shows no signs of slowing down as of the three-year 
anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2017.  Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin testified before a U.S. Senate panel in 
March warning the Appropriations Committee of Russia’s hybrid warfare 
tactics.259  Klimkin declared that Moscow currently has 4,200 regular 
troops, 40,000 militants, over 400 tanks, and 1,000 artillery platforms 
located in Eastern Ukraine.260  After a sharp escalation of hostilities at the 
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end of January and beginning of February 2017, the death total for the 
conflict has now reached nearly 10,000, with over 23,000 people 
injured.261  This death total includes over 2,000 civilians.262 
C. Law of Armed Conflict 
There are two types of armed conflicts defined in international 
humanitarian law.  The first is an international armed conflict (IAC), 
defined by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (except common Article 
3) and 1977 Additional Protocol I.263  Common Article 2 applies the 
definition to an “Armed conflict between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them.”  The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) 
commentary on that provision explains that the article refers to any 
“difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of 
armed forces is an armed conflict…even if one of the Parties denies the 
existence of a state of war.”264 
Second, the main sources governing non-international armed 
conflicts (NIAC) are common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and Article 1 of 1977’s Additional Protocol II.265  Common Article 
3 applies to “armed conflicts not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”266  This 
encompasses military conflict between armed government forces and 
non-government groups, or between two such non-government groups.  
However, a “threshold of confrontation” must be reached to fall under 
this Article, including a level of intensity requiring the government’s use 
of military force against the insurgents, as opposed to mere police forces, 
and a level of organization within the command structure of the 
insurgents that enables the group to sustain military operations.267 
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II adopts a slightly narrower 
definition of non-international armed conflict.  The document applies to 
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armed conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations…”268  The definition is more 
restrictive because it requires an element of territorial control, and 
expressly applies to armed conflicts between State armed forces and 
dissident armed forces. 
D. Application in the Donbas 
While the ICRC has declared the conflict in the Donbas to be a 
NIAC, other international bodies such as Amnesty International have 
declared it to be an IAC between Russia and Ukraine.269  While the hybrid 
war strategy allows the Russian government to continue to deny its 
involvement in the conflict, under the laws of war the NIAC in eastern 
Ukraine appears to have escalated into a parallel IAC in August 2014 and 
January 2015.270 
During the spring and summer of 2014, the conflict should have 
been characterized as a Protocol II NIAC.  While the common Article 3 
definition also applied because of the deployment of Ukraine’s military 
forces and the command structure and military hierarchy within the 
separatist forces, the Protocol II definition was better suited because of 
the territorial control the rebels maintained.  They took control of both 
administration buildings and military installations, as well as strategic 
highways, railroads, and airports.271  Their army was organized under a 
military hierarchy, with multiple battalions led by Russian military 
veterans such as the lead commander Igor Girkin.272  It therefore appears 
that the elements of territorial control and organized dissident armed 
forces satisfied a Protocol II definition. 
The August 2014 and February 2015 resupply of weapons, 
ammunition, military support vehicles, and troops combined with the 
available evidence from the Battle of Illovaisk and Debaltseve escalated 
the conflict to an IAC.  The threshold for IAC is relatively low, and the 
inclusion or presence of any Russian soldiers fighting with or leading 
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rebels against the Ukrainian government forces would create a parallel 
IAC between Ukraine and Russia, in addition to the NIAC between 
Ukraine and the rebels.273  The common Article 2 definition would apply 
if there was any evidence of Russian soldiers present and fighting in the 
conflict, as the definition includes intervention of “members of the armed 
forces” of another State (emphasis added).274  As shown through 
interviews and investigative reports, there is ample evidence that 
members of the Russian armed forces are participating in the armed 
conflict. 
In the case against Bosnian-Serb Dusko Tadic, the International 
Criminal Tribunal ruled that an IAC would exist if one State exercised 
“overall control” over forces that go beyond the “mere financing and 
equipping of such forces” to include “participation in the planning and 
supervision of military operations.”275  There is ample evidence of Russia 
providing arms, troops and financial assistance to the rebels, however 
little evidence exists to determine whether Russian authorities are directly 
planning operations.276  Yet Putin has shown that he maintains heavy 
influence over the separatist leaders, and has wielded this influence to 
postpone local elections and withdraw certain weaponry.277  While this 
does not conclusively determine any military operational planning, it 
does support an inference of control that goes beyond mere financing and 
equipping of the separatist forces.  Someone high up the chain of Russian 
military command had to order the troop movements of the 5th Tank 
Brigade, the 37th Motorized Infantry Brigade, and others from the 
Russian military camp Kuzminsky; and it would follow that whomever 
did was participating ‘in the planning and supervision of military 
operations.’ 
Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and guiding principles of the 
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
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Charter of the United Nations, these actions also constitute an illegal use 
of force that is contrary to peaceful values indoctrinated in international 
law.  Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the “use of force against…the political 
independence” of another State was further clarified in the 1970 non-
binding resolution, which prohibited “any attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State.”278  
The combination of Russian soldiers, advanced weaponry, and military 
equipment that has been documented in eastern Ukraine appears to be an 
attempt to disrupt the national unity and political independence of 
Ukraine.279  While the postponing of the separatist elections was an 
important diplomatic achievement, it has created a frozen quagmire in the 
Donbas that Putin is counting on to destabilize Poroshenko’s pro-Western 
regime.  The conflict has made it impossible for the Poroshenko 
administration to effectively govern, particularly in a country that was 
already in need of economic and regulatory reform. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While these conflicts are quite distinct in nature, they both reinforce 
a theme of Russia interpreting international law however it sees fit, 
manipulating and ignoring whichever tenants may be inconvenient to 
their national security strategy without any fear of legal consequence or 
repercussion.  Although Western democracies have not been models of 
excellence in following international law while waging complex wars 
against supranational terrorist regimes, this does not give Putin legal carte 
blanche to ‘fix’ what he considers “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” 
of the 20th century: the demise of the Soviet Union.280  As Russia 
continues to display a willingness to magnify its military influence 
throughout regions of global significance, it is vital for the West to 
continue to protect the Baltic, Eastern Europe, and in particular, 
Ukraine’s democratic interest and desire for integration and reform in the 
face of perpetual Kremlin interference. 
The deployment of a combination of unmarked Russian military 
throughout the Crimean peninsula on the eve of an illegally proffered 
political referendum amounts to several violations of governing 
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international treaties, agreements, constitutions, and customary 
international law principles.  The Kremlin’s current transparency about 
the military operation in Crimea stems from its success, yet due to the 
uncertain future of the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s Donbas by Russian 
troops and separatist forces, there is much less transparency and more 
room for plausible deniability from Russia.  Yet through the knowledge 
gathered from journalists on the ground and supranational organizations, 
it is apparent that the conflict is no longer solely a non-international 
armed conflict.  Russia has become an aggressor, perpetuating an 
international armed conflict against Ukraine through a mixture of 
strategic 21st century tactics, maskirovka, and hybrid warfare.  Europe 
must continue to strive to protect those who yearn for peaceful reform 
and democracy in Ukraine, while allowing it to retain a national culture 
that has only been allowed to flourish as a free nation so ephemerally in 
its rich, complex, and viciously violent history. 
 
